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**Newman and the  
Idea of a Catholic University**

by

Peter C. Erb  
*Professor in the Department of Religion and Culture,  
Wilfrid Laurier University*

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## NEWMAN AND THE IDEA OF A CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY

During the last decade, and framed within what have come to be designated as the "culture wars,"<sup>1</sup> an increasing number of studies on the nature and function of the university have appeared.<sup>2</sup> There are, as might be expected, numerous defenses of the humanities against recent technological and consumer-oriented sciences, but what is new in the debate is the number of reasoned attacks on the structure and function of contemporary academic institutions generally. The intellectual life of any nation or culture is not dependent on and has never been limited to universities, and while few would suggest that a civilization which wishes to maintain its vitality can afford not to support its cultural life, many remain unconvinced that such vitality is inevitably linked to ivied halls. It would be difficult, for example, to prove that a Faulkner is the direct result of his local university in the same way as eminent football giants are. Nor has attention been directed to secular education alone. In the swirl of the controversy a growing number of studies have been published on the question of the "Christian" university and of the place of religious commitment within the secular academy.<sup>3</sup>

The arguments differ widely, but most of these studies make at least passing reference to John Henry Newman's *The Idea of a University*,<sup>4</sup> the single most cited volume on educational theory written in the past century and a half. Some time ago J.M. Cameron wrote that "modern thinking on university education is a series of footnotes to Newman's lectures and essays,"<sup>5</sup> and it is no surprise as a result that Newman's book should have appeared recently in a new format, especially directed to the general reading public in a series entitled "Rethinking the Western Tradition."<sup>6</sup>

The extensive use of a Roman Catholic Cardinal's writing to support secular positions may be surprising, although in Newman's case the practice is now so commonplace that his religious affiliation has become an affable eccentricity that adds the flavor of foreign wisdom to provincial prose. Certainly Newman's *The Idea of a University* is one of the most cited books on educational theory. Whether it is as often read as quoted is doubtful; yet so often is reference made to his theory that it may be useful to revisit it once more, if only to exorcise lingering and malignant spirits.

### NEWMAN'S INTENTION IN THE *IDEA*

Even for those who revel in Newman's prose, the *Idea* is difficult going. There are of course the purple passages for which the Cardinal is well-known and loved, but they are not always clearly linked and are many times repetitions of earlier, more succinctly-made points. The book's disarray reflects the turmoil of the times in which it was written. The year

Newman composed his initial lectures for his book was an especially busy one.<sup>7</sup> In April, 1851 the Irish Archbishop Paul Cullen asked him to join in the foundation of a Catholic university in Dublin. His work was interrupted in part by another project: in August, in the virulently anti-Catholic climate formed by Rome's declaration to restore its ecclesiastical hierarchy in England, Newman delivered a series of hastily written lectures in defense of the Catholic faith which eventually resulted in a criminal charge of libel against him. In November he began to compose the inaugural discourse for the new university which were written, delivered, and rewritten through the next twelve months, while he struggled with his legal defense, stood trial, was found guilty (although "justified morally"), and awaited a judgment which might have included a prison sentence.

The disorder in Newman's life at the time explains much of the repetition in the nine discourses which were finally chosen to make up the major section of the *Idea*.<sup>8</sup> And the number of expectations on the part of his listeners and readers—strict ultramontanists, Dublin businessmen, and educators who shared his Oxford ideals—increased the confusion. But repetition or lack of clarity does not excuse the way in which later readers have consistently used adages plucked from Newman's final version of the *Idea* as shibboleths to finish a war which he could never have imagined. Thus, to choose but one example, many modern defenders of the humanities insist that liberal arts must stand on their own, above all possible social relevance and aside from any claim to utility. This group puts forth a sort of intellectual "art for art's sake" argument, delighting in Newman's maxims that "Knowledge is an end in itself" and that the purpose of the liberal arts is "enlargement of mind," a sort of fulfillment of true humanity beyond all practical concerns. In the face of their opponents (those outside the universities who judge all educational endeavors in terms of "accountability" or those within the academy who insist that higher education be pursued as practical resistance to dominant cultural ideologies), their citation of Newman makes some sense but fails to explain the wide attention he devotes to professional training in his work.

The difficulty in this and other cases is that Newman's stated intentions for the work are seldom taken seriously. Thus, in his preface he lays out clearly two main principles, the first of which is often quoted, the second almost never. We do well to read them in full and together:

The view taken of a University in these Discourses is the following:—That it is a place of *teaching universal knowledge*. This implies that its object is, on the one hand, intellectual, not moral; and, on the other, that it is the diffusion and extension of knowledge rather than the advancement. If its object were scientific and philosophical discovery, I do not see why a University should have students; if religious training, I do not see how it can be the seat of literature and science.

Such is a University in its essence, and independently of its relation to the Church. But practically speaking, it cannot fulfill its object duly, such as I have described it, without the Church's assistance; or, to use the theological term, the Church is necessary for its *integrity*. Not that its main characters are changed by this incorporation: it still has the office of intellectual education; but the Church steadies it in the performance of that office.

Such are the main principles of the Discourses which follow. (5)

Much of the confusion in modern interpretations of Newman's *Idea* arises from the tendency to read the first principle aside from the second and to insist that what he is speaking of throughout the work—his primary intention—is the university only in its *essence*, aside from the function of religion and theology. If read in this way, the work makes no sense, and, thus, in contemporary discussions, its structure as a whole, which is primarily concerned with theology, is almost always set aside.<sup>9</sup>

Following his introduction, Newman takes up the theme of theology as a branch of knowledge and then, having reviewed theology's bearing on other branches of knowledge and those branches' bearing on theology, he turns in the fifth discourse, the one which alone appears to interest modern readers, to "Knowledge its own End." Although structurally central—standing in the exact middle of the nine discourses—this chapter is not in any way the conclusion of the work. Once he has made his point on knowledge as an end in itself, he proceeds further, discussing knowledge in its relation to learning, then to professional skill, and finally, returning to the point of his beginning, to religion.<sup>10</sup>

#### KNOWLEDGE AS "AN" END, NOT "THE" END

Because writers have often treated the fifth discourse as the center and not merely as the midpoint of the argument, it may serve as a useful beginning for the present discussion. In that lecture Newman turns his attention from studies to students, and in regard to students, he writes, he will investigate "in what sense [the university's] teaching ... carries the attribute of Utility along with it." (94) Even in this central discourse on knowledge as an end in itself, Newman takes up the question of utility.

Later in this paper we shall look directly at distinctions between the theoretical arts and the useful (that is, productive and mechanical) arts and at the nature of the community in which all the arts are practiced, but these matters are secondary. Contemporary readers of the *Idea* tend to consider the issue of the utility of study in light of a debate which forces one to give priority to either practice or theory. What is forgotten is that in our present setting, whether one is arguing in favor of the relevance or "irrelevance" of academic endeavors, finality is given on both sides of the debate to knowledge itself. The contending parties differ only over the

nature of that knowledge. For those whom we might call Modern Realists the end to be attained is applicable knowledge; for their opponents, the New Idealists, knowledge must be pursued only for its own sake. Both groups argue within a radically secular post-Enlightenment perspective for which there is nothing beyond human knowledge and in which the university becomes the epitome of human endeavor. Hence the debate over the university is also a debate over the purpose and end of human life.

Neither of these perspectives is Newman's. He fully understands the implications of the secular turn in modern society, not opposing it in one sense, but accepting it. Thus he recognizes the limitations of arguments for metaphysical realities drawn "from the general facts of human society and the course of history." He is post-modernist enough to know that any argument on the basis of "nature" is already included within human constructs and that such cannot lead him any more than contemporary non-theists to certitude concerning divine being: "... these do not warm me or enlighten me; they do not take away the winter of my desolation, or make the buds unfold or the leaves grow within me, and my moral being rejoice." More existentialist than a Camus, more foundational in his view of human knowledge than many a late twentieth-century academic, Newman sees the world as "nothing else than the prophet's scroll, full of lamentations, and mourning, and woe."<sup>11</sup>

What distinguishes Newman from his secular comparators is his refusal to limit humanity to epistemological despair. The university is a place of teaching universal knowledge, and such knowledge, albeit its own end, is not the end of human existence. The object of the university is intellectual. There is another object within the human community, namely the moral, and with this the university "in its essence" is not any more involved than it is with the advancement (as opposed to the diffusion) of knowledge. Knowledge is an end in itself but it is not the end of human life.

#### KNOWLEDGE, COMMUNITY, AND THE FORMATION OF HABIT

The knowledge which is its own end and which is taught in the university is for Newman universal knowledge. Convinced of the unity of creation, Newman insists that all branches of knowledge are one. If a student's reading is "confined to only one subject ... such division of labor may favor the advancement of a particular pursuit, ... [but] it has a tendency to contract the mind." The university must therefore endeavor to "enlarge the range of studies." (95)

Implied in this definition of universal knowledge is a definition of community, and consequently of a community that is both spatially and temporally universal. The advantage of a university as "a seat of universal learning" is that in such a place there will arise an "assemblage" of learned individuals, each pursuing specific disciplines and at times rivaling one another, although not without an inter-disciplinary perspective in which

individual scholars "adjust together the claims and relations of their respective subjects of investigation." In the respect, consultation, and aid scholars give to one another "is created a pure and clear atmosphere of thought, which the student also breathes." (95)

In this setting each student, Newman continues, "profits by an intellectual tradition," a tradition which even in its most secular form, one surmises, shadows Catholic tradition as it aspires to universality and therefore requires the Church for its integrity.<sup>12</sup> The academic tradition, "independent of particular teachers," guides the student in the respective choice of subjects and "duly interpret[s]" those which are chosen. By intellectual tradition the student "apprehends the great outlines of knowledge, the principles on which it rests, [and] the scale of its parts, ... as [that student] otherwise cannot apprehend them."

Hence it is that [a student's] education is called "Liberal." A habit of mind is formed which lasts through life, of which the attributes are freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, and wisdom; ... a philosophical habit, ... the special fruit of the education furnished at a University. (96)

Newman then points out to his readers once more that he is here treating the university "in its treatment of its students"; there may be other places or modes of teaching, but insofar as the university is a place of teaching, it is directed to the formation of the "philosophical habit." Newman's use of the word "liberal" in relation to this habit is used in its etymological sense and means "free." The student is free chiefly because the philosophical habit he develops is not bound by a particular, limited person. But the habit so developed is not distinguishable from Knowledge. "[T]he end of University Education [is to impart] Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge"; (96) the university's "end cannot be divided from that knowledge itself," for knowledge in a distinctive way "is capable of being its own end."

This knowledge which is its own end is not, according to Newman, some objective information, able to be transmitted from one mind to another as object. Knowledge cannot be separated from knowing, and knowing occurs only within a knowing subject, a subject which, as human, exists only within a community. Thus are bound together what Newman earlier described as the philosophical habit, philosophical knowledge, and the intellectual tradition, and in this way Newman forces upon his readers a definition of knowledge, more personal, psychological and dynamic, but less individualistic than knowledge privately possessed, since for him knowledge arises actively in and for the individual within a communal framework. Universal knowledge is not in any sense a Faustian search to control all data—it is not inclusive knowledge. Rather, it is the habit of knowing each specific subject in the context of all that can be known. In regard to its own specificity the habit of knowing in the framework of universal knowl-

edge will inevitably beget humility; in regard to its own humble grasp of the universal in which it participates, this habit in some way is a rising above itself, a grasping of truth.

Such is the constitution of the human mind, that any kind of knowledge, if it be really such, is its own reward. And if this is true of all knowledge, it is true of that special philosophy, which I have made to consist in a comprehensive view of truth in all its branches, of the relations of science to science, of their mutual bearings, and their respective values. (97)

Knowledge of this kind will quite clearly require "a great deal of thought in the compassing, and a great deal of trouble in the attaining." The energy devoted to its attainment is "natural"; in the acquisition of such knowledge "we are satisfying a direct need of our nature," a nature which in its reaching toward its own perfection is dependent "on a number of external aids and appliances. Knowledge, as one of the principles of these [aids], is valuable for what its very presence in us does for us *after the manner of a habit*" (italics mine).

Newman grants that such knowledge or such a habit may be turned to "further account," but maintains that in itself it does not "subserve any direct end." As such, knowledge is an end in itself and thus "free" from any other ends. It is not servile; but Newman does not suppose that as a result all mental exercise is "liberal":

[T]hat alone is liberal knowledge, which stands on its own pretensions, which is independent of sequel, expects no complement, refuses to be *informed* (as it is called) by any end, or absorbed into any art, in order duly to present itself to our contemplation. The most ordinary pursuits have this specific character, if they are self-sufficient and complete; the highest lose it when they minister to something beyond them.

Even theology, when "instead of being cultivated as contemplation, [is] limited to the purposes of the pulpit;" (101) cannot be classified as "liberal," nor, to this degree, pursued as a university discipline.

#### KNOWLEDGE, THEORY/PRACTICE, AND REASON

This point in his argument, when Newman refers to contemplation in the context of human perfection, follows a lengthy discussion of the classical view of knowledge as its own end. Newman contrasts this view with the modern concern for the utility of knowledge. Immediately after his definition of contemplation he takes up the classical theme again, "appealing to the ancients" and quoting Aristotle directly:

"Of possessions," [the Philosopher] says, "those rather are useful, which bear fruit; those *liberal*, which tend to enjoyment. By fruitful I mean, which yield revenue; by enjoyable, where nothing accrues of consequence beyond the using." [Rhetoric 1.5] (102)

Newman is here developing his argument within an earlier debate with which he was well acquainted, namely the classical division between theory and practice, and its continuation in the Roman and Christian tradition as contemplation and action. It is to this that his earlier references to contemplation are directed.<sup>13</sup> Since the time of Pythagoras the ancients had divided human activity into two parts. One part, *ton kalliston theoria*, consists in the contemplation of the most beautiful things. The other part, *praxis*, is the practical life of participation in business and political action. For them, the end of theory was wisdom (*sophia*). For many ancients and early Christians, "theory" (*theoria*) carried religious connotations: a popular etymology linked it to the Greek word for God (*theos*), just as in Latin *contemplatio* was associated with *templum*.<sup>14</sup>

In both these realms of human endeavor, as the etymology suggests, religion is considered necessary. Freedom too is understood as essential. Aristotle, like other ancients, insisted that one could pursue the theoretical life only if one had leisure, that is, were free from business and political activities.<sup>15</sup> (The Latin opposition between *otium* and *negotium* conveys the same idea.) Freedom from these activities did not mean one could not contemplate them, but it did mean that one was not troubled immediately with the necessities of nature, or perhaps better: that as one transcended the necessities of nature, one could contemplate the eternal. Aristotle viewed nature itself as eternal, and therefore contemplation or theorizing for him covered not only those subjects which today we would place under the social sciences (psychological, social, political, and historical human behavior) but also those which we would place under the natural sciences. Contemplation is reflected in the universal framework. The moment one approaches such subjects in mere curiosity or for practical purposes, one is no longer theorizing. Hence wisdom is a knowledge of divine, everlasting things, and it is therefore *divine* knowledge.

Whereas *theoria* is concerned with watching, *praxis* directs itself to doing. The first pursues the liberal arts, the second, the practical arts. A third aspect of human activity involves "making" and pertains to the productive arts. The two latter categories are directed to human happiness. Newman is well aware of all these divisions and has carefully thought his way through Aristotle's reflections on them. But Newman's world is different from that of the ancients because scientific developments of the seventeenth century had called the priority of the contemplative life into serious question. Newman places these developments at the door of Francis Bacon. Appealing to Cicero, he writes that the Roman orator "expressly denies [knowledge's] bearing upon social life altogether, strange as such a pro-

cedure is to those who live after the rise of Baconian philosophy.... The idea of benefiting society by means of 'the pursuit of science and knowledge' did not enter at all into the motives which he would assign for their cultivation." (98-99) Nevertheless, one must take care not to suppose that for Newman or for the ancients either of these lives is realized fully in itself alone. *Theoria* and *praxis* are dimensions of all human behavior, and we are fully human to the degree that we fulfill both aspects of our lives.

Whereas Cicero and Aristotle before him were most concerned with distinguishing the theoretical and practical arts, marking the latter primarily as useful and not deigning to discuss the mechanical arts directly, Newman at several points turns his argument to the mechanical arts, particularly because of the post-Baconian emphasis on them, an emphasis that his ancient forebears could hardly have imagined possible. But we must not suppose that Newman is opposed to the mechanical, making arts or to practical, doing activities. Knowledge, he argues, is both dynamic habit and content; it is a union of Reason and of what we are accustomed to think of primarily as a body of facts. For Newman only such a union can be properly understood as Knowledge. Without the philosophic habit or Reason anything understood as knowledge is mere information. Knowledge to be Knowledge "is called by the name of Science or Philosophy, when it is acted upon, informed, or if I may use a strong figure, impregnated by Reason." (103; italics mine<sup>69</sup>)

We must take care not to suppose that Reason is some sort of human faculty, some trait of an individual mind embedded genetically and as such able to be strengthened according to the best training procedures. Reason, for Newman, cannot be separated from that which it knows. "Reason is the principle of that intrinsic fecundity of Knowledge, which to those who possess it is its especial value, and which dispenses with the necessity of their looking abroad for any end to rest upon external to itself." (103) Insofar as reason operates as a "mechanical process," "Knowledge is power, and its end is utility. But when Knowledge "falls back upon that Reason which informs it, [it] resolv[es] itself into Philosophy," and is properly called liberal. As such, it is something intellectual, something which grasps what it perceives through the senses, something which takes a view of things, which sees more than the senses convey; which reasons upon what it sees, and while it sees; which invests it with an idea. (104)

Because they are primarily oriented toward students, their learning, and their intellectual formation, universities are places of education, not of instruction. They are not directed to knowledge which is

a mere extrinsic or accidental advantage, which is ours today and another's tomorrow, which may be got from a book and easily forgotten again,... which we can borrow for the occasion ... and take into

the market; it is an acquired illumination, it is a habit, a personal possession, and an inward endowment. (105)

In a later chapter Newman, focusing again on the universal and the dynamic, expands on his point:

That only is true enlargement of mind which is the power of viewing many things at once as one whole, of referring them severally to their true place in the universal system, of understanding their respective values, and determining their mutual dependence. Thus is that force of Universal Knowledge ... set up in the individual intellect, and constitutes its perfection. Possessed of this real illumination, the mind never views any part of the extended subject-matter of Knowledge without recollecting that it is but a part. (122-23)

#### THE PROBLEM OF USEFUL KNOWLEDGE

There is a tendency among some modern defenders of the liberal arts to cease reading Newman at this point, to ignore his insistence on the unity between knowledge and intellectual habit, to set to one side his emphasis on illumination, and in so doing to miss central issues in his argument. I have mentioned this group above as maintaining an "art for art's sake" defense; what is problematic with their position is not the closing of "art" upon itself, but the hidden principle in the argument which universalizes "art" and disparages its use, although even Newman's secular step-child, Walter Pater, cannot avoid crediting an experiential end to art which in some way will stand beyond the art itself, namely: to "burn with a hard gem-like flame."<sup>70</sup> Newman foresaw in part the implications of an "end in itself" argument. Any limitation of a particular art or branch of knowledge to itself alone will inevitably, as limited, affect its use in and for the knower. If one makes a radical separation between theory and practice and negates practice in the world as it is constituted, the only consequence possible will be some form of radically individualistic, solipsistic decadence, a *fin de siècle*, the death of an age.

As a result, Newman insists that theory and practice cannot be separated in knowing and that educational theory cannot thus ignore the question of use. The end of knowing is paradoxically both in the knowing and not in it. "Truth of whatever kind is the proper object of the intellect; its cultivation then lies in fitting it to apprehend and contemplate truth," and the search for truth goes on as one continues one's formation toward perfection. Knowledge is an end in itself because in it the individual's Reason, the cultivated intellect arising in and with knowledge, is turned to its own end, namely, the contemplation of Truth. It is not that use or utility has been set aside; rather it is "that intellectual culture is its own end; for what has its end in itself, has its use in itself also." (142)

Although there is a risk of falling into a utilitarian defense, an

example may be helpful here. My father was a cabinet maker and trim carpenter. From early on my brothers and I worked with him, but, although my brothers could now easily leave their present vocations and take up carpentry, I could not. We all studied with my father, but whereas I always looked to the use of the knowledge offered—how is the making of a mortise directly related to the production of a window sash?—my brothers attended to carpentry itself and were formed as carpenters. As a result I remain an expert at glazing windows but cannot perfect the smallest repairs elsewhere.

The formation of a habit which may be universally applied cannot occur when its object is a highly particularized, specific use. A human being, for the Catholic Christian Newman, is created for full perfection "after the image of God" or, in the more limited, secularized terms we are accustomed to use today, a person has infinite possibility. Should such an individual delimit his end by directing it to specific uses, he will give over his human dignity, and his proper end, in itself eternal, will be reduced to the decay of every transitory, passing use. For this reason Newman will not allow Knowledge to be confused with information, or education with instruction. His primary interest is in the former of these pairs, and yet he is not unmindful of the latter. As a Catholic Christian Newman could not allow his theory to float above the created world like Plato's Ideas. At the center of his theology, after all, was the Incarnation. For Christianity redemption occurs in the wear and tear, the practicalities, of the real world, just as for Robert Frost "Earth's the right place for love; I don't know where it's likely to go better."

Because of this Newman consistently works out his theory of liberal education as an end in itself with an eye to what Aristotle would have referred to as the practical (doing) and the making (productive or mechanical) arts. There are interesting parallels in this regard between Newman's support of liberal education and Aristotle's discussion of ethics. Thus, following the directives in Aristotle's *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics* and in his *Rhetoric*, Newman holds that the end of both the doing and the making arts is happiness.<sup>18</sup> Happiness for Aristotle is the end of ethics, the chief of all the doing arts, and for him ethics, while absolutely a practical science, serves as a sort of epitome of the theoretical sciences. This is because when one speculates in ethics about the end of human actions, one is engaged practically in an action (*viz.*, speculating, studying) the use of which is "in itself."<sup>19</sup>

Furthermore, Newman does not set aside professional education. The longest of his discourses is devoted to "Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Professional Skill," and of the ten lectures eventually published with the original discourses, four were directly related to the professions. Moreover, Newman's university was to have four faculties: Liberal Arts, Medicine, Law, and Theology. The last three have obviously professional uses. What

he included in the faculty of Liberal Arts is also of interest in this regard. The Arts faculty was to be divided into the study of letters and of sciences. The study of letters embraced ancient languages, ancient and modern history, archaeology (primarily the study of historical remains and manuscripts), and English literature and criticism. As the sciences, he lists logic, metaphysics, ethics (including economics and political science), physics, chemistry, botany, geology, and whatever sciences might be developed. What is particularly interesting in this classification is that Newman expected a school of engineering to be formed under the Arts faculty, and that two years after he delivered the lectures, he submitted a report in which he indicated that among the aims of the new university was the provision of a liberal education for those who were destined toward "mercantile" occupations, the stimulation and support of primary and secondary education throughout Ireland, and the development of institutions for the "useful" arts.<sup>20</sup>

#### CONTEMPLATING TRUTH IN COMMUNITY, TEMPORAL AND ETERNAL

All this, of course, was considered within Newman's argument as a whole, at the center, about and above which, stood his commitment to the speculative, contemplative, theoretical, liberal arts—his commitment to institutions in which knowledge might be pursued for its own sake, in which philosophical habit might be developed in individuals and communities for no "use" other than the development of the habit, Reason, and of the intellectual tradition itself. There was one other principle which Newman considered primary and to which he directed his readers' attention at the beginning of the *Idea*. The university, he said, is a "place of *teaching* Universal Knowledge," and as a corollary to this he developed his principle of "Knowledge as an end in itself," but he then went on to insist that "the Church is necessary for [the University's] integrity." (5)

Newman's use of italics in these two prefatory principles tells us much. In the first he has emphasized "teaching," thereby focusing his reader's attention on knowledge not as content but on its personal aspect, on its function as a dynamic philosophical habit, enlargement of mind, active illumination, and formation. In the second he emphasized a university's integrity. The institution was to be integrated in itself (according to an etymology of the Latin word *universitas* as "a turning on [versare] one thing [unum]) and integrated into the human community as a whole. Thus it would have integrity in a social or moral sense.

As we have already seen, the one thing on which the university centers is the contemplation of Truth. Newman was as aware as any post-Mannheim intellectual of the social construction of knowledge, and for this reason, in his initial exploration of the meaning of Universal knowledge he was drawn to speak of the place where it is taught as an "assemblage" of scholars representing as far as possible all disciplines, including

theology. Universal knowledge was not for him the totality of all things known, nor did he propose as the goal of university teaching the inculcation of all knowledge in a single student's mind. Universal knowledge was not knowing all there was to be known, but rather, knowing single things within the framework of all there was to be known, so that one knew a particular thing as but a part of the whole and always humbly looked to the whole, to the universal. As Newman had taught many years earlier:

Philosophy, then, is Reason exercised upon Knowledge; or the Knowledge not merely of things in general, but of things in their relations to one another. It is the power of referring everything to its true place in the universal system.<sup>21</sup>

Hence the contemplation of Truth is not so much the contemplation of the reality of a single fact as the contemplation of that single reality within an ever expanding and mysterious universal horizon. It is radical openness. That is why the university must in practice have represented within it as many disciplines as possible and why Newman (working from his experience of the Oxford College where students lived, ate, and studied together) insists on continual and dynamic communications between the various disciplines. Knowledge grows within community and within a community's tradition.

As socially constructed, knowledge is always framed by the community within which it develops, and the truth it contemplates, if limited to that particular community, will thus inevitably be provincial and culturally relative. For its integrity then, any seat of teaching Universal knowledge must be established in the context of the universal "catholic" community, the *orbis terrarum* considered both in space and time, which alone makes judgments secure. Separate branches of learning cannot exist healthily by themselves.<sup>22</sup> The catholicity of the Church is essential for any university, no matter how large. Newman's argument here has changed little from that of 1841, when he first insisted that there were other ends than those of secular knowledge: "If virtue be a mastery over the mind, if its end be action, if its perfections be inward order, harmony, and peace, we must seek it in graver and holier places than in Libraries and Reading-rooms."<sup>23</sup>

Likewise, at the close of the fifth discourse on Knowledge as its own end Newman takes up his principle on the Church and a university's integrity once more. He begins by repeating his earlier premise, separating liberal knowledge from any uses that may be created for it, insisting "that it is as real a mistake to burden it with virtue or religion as with the mechanical arts. Its direct business is not to steel the soul against temptation or to console it in affliction, any more than to set the loom in motion, or to direct the steam carriage."

Newman's liberal education is limited. It "makes not the Christian, nor the Catholic." (110) The best it can do is shape "a cultivated

intellect, a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble, courteous bearing in the conduct of life," but for human dignity this is not enough. Liberal knowledge falls far short of our human aspirations—it can attach itself as much "to the profligate, to the heartless," as to the good:

Quarry the granite rock with razors, or moor the vessel with a thread of silk; then may you hope with such keen and delicate instruments as human knowledge and human reason to contend against those giants, the passion and pride of man. (111)

Newman is thus not Liberal in the contemporary sense of the term. He does not suppose that liberal arts will overcome the violence and evil which surround us. For him this does not mean that we give up the ideal set forth and turn university education to useful ends. "Everything has its own perfection, be it higher or lower in the scale of things; and the perfection of one is not the perfection of another." (111) The object of a liberal education "is but a temporal object, and a transitory possession.... [T]he powers of the intellect decay [as] the powers of the body have decayed before them." (112) We do not therefore cease to strive for health or to comprehend the nature of the world about us. "We attain to heaven by using this world well, though it is to pass away; we perfect our nature not by undoing it, but by adding to it what is more than nature, and directing it towards aims higher than its own." (112)

EX CORDE ECCLESIAE

In 1990, a century after his death, Newman is quoted favorably in John Paul II's "Apostolic Constitution on Catholic Universities, *Ex corde ecclesiae*." Indeed, other than the numerous citations of recent papal pronouncements and other Vatican reflections in the document, Newman is the only modern author quoted.<sup>24</sup> Thus, the Constitution states: "Born from the heart of the Church, a Catholic university is located in that course of tradition which may be traced back to the very origin of the university as an institution."<sup>25</sup> Newman would well have agreed: outside of the Church, a university has no integrity: "Every Catholic university, without ceasing to be a university, has a relationship to the Church which is essential to its institutional identity."<sup>26</sup>

Newman's place in such treatments of the modern Catholic university is not surprising. He would have been pleased with the title of the Constitution, reflecting as it does a central principle of his argument and one badly neglected by his modern secular commentators. Moreover, the title of the piece allows one to allude to his motto, *cor ad cor loquitur* ("heart speaks to heart"): in the end it will not be the intellect that will save us. To quote St. Ambrose with Newman: *Non in didactica complacuit Deo saluum facere populum suum*.<sup>27</sup> Few have been so foolhardy as to expect the university to redeem humankind.



Nevertheless, Newman chose not to outline the ideal of a Catholic university, but selected a less exclusive title for his work, using not "ideal", but "idea" (a word which in his and earlier language suggested the positive instantiation of an ideal), and commenting not on "the" university in its perfect form, but "a" specific institution of learning, locatable in one time and place. And for all the importance in his argument of the Church, he determined to omit the adjective "Catholic." Perhaps he felt no need for it. He had chosen and defended Catholicism at personal cost as all knew and he was writing from within the Church as the Rector of an explicitly Catholic institution.

But perhaps his omission of the adjective "Catholic" was more deliberate: one can attempt to establish "a" university "in its essence" without the Church, but any such attempt will result in an institution severely limited and provincial, an institution reaching toward the universal, but never gaining more than its own finger-tips. By omitting the adjective, Newman, accordingly, establishes his educational apologetic, allowing the secular (non-Catholic) university its share of dignity in its reflection of and aspiration to the universal catholic ideal, but at the same time calling it to attend to its predetermined failing.

Thus, at the close of his eighth discourse, "Knowledge and Religious Duty," Newman devotes his most impressive prose to describe "the *beau-ideal* of the world," (181) the gentleman, (179-80) that paragon of a university education which at the beginning of his study he explicitly rejected. (5-6, 10) The gentleman is "the creation, not of Christianity, but of civilization." (174) Christianity does not, of course, reject civilization; Christianity's central doctrine, the Incarnation, teaches that God became a human being to redeem human beings—and Catholic Christianity insists that analogously grace supports nature in helping nature become what it truly ought to be.<sup>28</sup> Newman, like his earlier Protestant opposite, Milton, could not "praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, untested and untried."

The ideal of the gentleman may "subserve the education" of a saint, but such an ideal, maintained for itself alone, limits the possibility ("the contemplation") of those outside the Church's embrace: "Basil and Julian were fellow-students at the schools of Athens; and one became the Saint and Doctor of the Church, the other her scoffing and relentless foe." (181) Against such foes as Julian Newman contends. Of their attractions he was always aware; what might have been their possibilities he does not deny. But the Gibbons and the Julians of this world are limited. And the Catholic Church's "principle is one and the same throughout: not to prohibit truth of any kind, but to see that no doctrines pass under the name of Truth but those which claim it rightfully."<sup>29</sup> (199)

Thus far Newman's ideal and that of *Ex corde ecclesiae* are in accord, and one may suppose that defenders of the Constitution will continue with Newman in his call to Catholic academics and administrators

of Catholic education institutions as they fulfill the duties of the Church towards Knowledge, the subject of his final discourse. The ideal he there puts forward is that of the patron of his Oratory, St. Philip Neri, who though he "lived in an age as traitorous to the interests of Catholicism as any that preceded it, *or can follow it*" (italics mine), did not give way to triumphalism. Neri in the sixteenth, like Newman's "orthodox" contemporaries in the nineteenth, "saw heathen forms mounting ... and forming in the thick air," and despite the contagion everywhere he "perceived that the mischief was to be met, not with argument, not with science, not with protests and warnings, not by the recluse or the preacher, but by means of the great counter-fascination of purity and truth." (199)

We might not fully wish to defend the deliberate parallel Newman here draws between Neri and himself. There is something perhaps too self-serving in that portrait. Be that as it may, it is in the first place intended to describe the perfection of the gentleman, the *beau-ideal* of the world, he set forth earlier:

[Neri] came to the Eternal City and he sat himself down there, and his home and his family gradually grew up around him, by the spontaneous accession of materials from without.... He sat in his small room, and they in their gay worldly dresses, the rich and the well-born, as well as the simple and illiterate, crowded into it.

They were drawn to the universal; they were after all in the Eternal City, and what they experienced was what Newman had earlier called for the Church to afford the university to experience—fascination, as truly fascinating as anything the world offered, and yet counter to it:

And they who came remained gazing and listening, till at length first one and then another threw off their bravery, and took his poor cassock and girdle instead: or, if they kept it, it was to put haircloth under it, or to take on them a rule of life, *while to the world they looked as before.* (200; italics mine)

#### THE CATHOLIC IN A SECULAR SETTING

Outside of the Eternal City, neglectful of the Apostle of Rome, any perfect idea of a university is impossible according to Newman. A university's integrity requires the Church, and the remaining pages of the *Idea* suggest ways in which that integrity can be supported in a Catholic university (explicitly noting in the closing discourse the Church's *duty* toward knowledge). Having personalized his argument after Discourse Five by turning from studies to students, Newman more particularly proposes ways whereby individual Catholic scholars may function in such a setting with this provision of integrity in mind.

Nonetheless, Newman's comment that some of Neri's followers might retain their cloak of bravery atop a hair shirt, appearing to the world

"as before," implies that there are cases in which the individual Catholic Christian scholar might be elsewhere than in a Catholic institution. With this comment, Newman directs his reader to reconsider the implications of his argument, not for the Catholic university itself, but for a Catholic educational institution and Catholic Christians situated in a secular setting.

From the earliest heady years of the Oxford Movement Newman recognized the growing importance of a secular state. No longer could secular and religious authorities be understood as working together in the maintenance of a unified Christian society. Parliament now was increasingly called on to represent opposing religious demands and could not thereby limit its resources to the support of one particular established religious group, even if it were understood by its adherents as a branch of the holy Catholic Church. The secular wing of government had effectively become the final arbiter in all major decisions affecting society, and when it functioned this way in the face of contending religious groups, even an "established" church came to be treated as one church among many, over all of which the State held sway. In such a situation an established church in fact was more dependent on the state than other religious bodies who, whatever the practical outcome, could insist on their divine calling, authority, and integrity and demand their rights separate from and over against the secular power.<sup>30</sup>

Royal Supremacy meant one thing when secular and religious authorities functioned together, but quite something else when the state gained sovereignty over the Church. For Newman, as for many of his co-believers who followed him out of the Anglican communion and into the Roman Catholic Church, such bondage was unacceptable, if the Church was inflexible and mediated divine grace to the world. The Church to be the Church must be free of all secular authority in its decisions and activities. Nevertheless, to be the Church, it necessarily operates in the world, and to do so must be in dialogue with that world. The problem was to make certain that the world did not shape the Church.

Newman viewed the relationship of the Church and the university in somewhat similar ways. Against Manning's resolution to support only Catholic universities for Catholic youth,<sup>31</sup> Newman, even in these inaugural lectures as rector of a very Catholic university, dreamt of some mediate path, of some return to the spires of non-Catholic Oxford in a Catholic guise. Could not Catholic institutions and Catholic scholars be present in the secular university, speaking and working with it, and directing it to the universality of Truth which it tended to, but which, outside of the Church, it could not attain? For Newman the question was rhetorical: such institutions and scholars could and should do so.

#### THE IDEA AND THE MODERN UNIVERSITY

All this is, of course, Newman's world, not ours. We are now almost fully secularized,<sup>32</sup> and in the context of the present "culture wars," there are

difficulties that the Church has seldom faced before. The Catholic university in this context is understood by those outside it as one among other contending positions, and the Catholic scholar, whether within or without a Catholic educational structure, as obedientially confined to a single pre-judged and prescribed opinion, or at the least to a preferred philosophy. Unfortunately the same pattern is sometimes maintained by scholars within such a university's walls, who often stand aside from the discussion, pursuing their own limited disciplines and presuming that the religious studies or theology departments can adequately represent any Catholic interests. It is not so much that religious institutions have been disestablished or even brought to heel under their secular masters. Rather, they can scarcely maintain continuity with their own redefined traditions and have little opportunity for a serious hearing. This is because the ideals that such institutions once turned to for guidance and the authority that they once claimed have undergone radical revision within the dominant secular discourse of the contemporary West.<sup>33</sup> The interpretive tradition in which most Catholics first receive a papal pronouncement, for example, is not the Christian tradition, but that of a post-enlightened liberalism, mediated through the popular press. Little wonder that most think of "human dignity" in terms of legal rights and equate the language of "market economy" in Catholic social commentaries with the rhetoric of American capitalism.<sup>34</sup> In such a climate theological, like moral, positions inevitably are seen as private matters, consumer choices in an increasingly one-dimensional fiscal world where the activities of citizens are acceptable only if their culturally-relative ideologies do not conflict with the material pursuits of their neighbors or the sovereign will of a supposed majority.

In this setting can we continue the intellectual tradition of Newman, pursuing knowledge for its own sake, without belief in transcendent ideals or in a universal human community extended throughout space and time, as held by him to be essential to the integrity of the whole liberal arts enterprise? Newman's answer would be "No." According to his argument some form of transcendence will always arise. The American constitutional requirement that "the state shall establish no religion" by its very words constitutes an established religious norm, namely that all religions are equal as competing players in a game, the rules of which are established by a non-partisan state and to which all other social or political units are subservient. If one does not point to the universal and the catholic, a limited form will establish itself in that place and demonically claim those rights as its own. At the borders of our language and thought what ancient rhetoric and logic referred to as the peritrope always arises: all statements are relative, but not this one. Only in a disembodied mental process is infinite regression possible and the peritrope avoided. In the real world of everyday practical decisions, in world which takes the "body" and the "other" seriously, even non-action has its finality.

Newman does not respond to the situation by calling for the triumphant establishment of a university (either religious or secular) to lay claim to its own infallibility and shout its answers to the rest of the world.<sup>35</sup> Such activities on the part of a Catholic university or Catholic scholar within a secular university would reflect not a catholic or universal perspective, but a sectarian one, one which has effectively removed itself from the world in which it is to be embodied. Against this sectarianism Newman directs attention to the one mode by which a university's calling can be fulfilled—namely, humility.

By itself without the Church, the university will fail in gaining its true integrity and, like all secular establishments limited to their own ends, dwell in demonic pride, albeit a pride cleverly disguised:

Pride, under such training, instead of running to waste in the education of mind, is turned to account; it gets a new name; it is called self-respect; and ceases to be the disagreeable, uncompanionable quality which it is in itself. Though it be the motive principle of the soul it seldom comes to view.... [I]t becomes the very staple of the religion and morality held in honor in a day like our own.... It is the stimulating principle of providence on the one hand and of free expenditure on the other.... It breathes upon the face of the community, and the hollow sepulcher is forthwith beautiful to look upon. (177-78)

Pride of this sort is not easily overcome. Not in any way a virtue, it pretends to be one.<sup>36</sup> Point it to the transcendent and the universal, call it in such contemplation to humility, and it will transform humility into modesty. Like all aspects of the demonic, pride finds a way to restructure an enemy's offensive and turn it to its own ends. "[T]his is how it can be proud at the very time it is unassuming. To humility indeed it does not even aspire; humility is one of the most difficult of virtues to attain and ascertain." (176)

Nonetheless, Newman does have a solution. The Church is necessary to the integrity of the university because it directs the university and those who seek knowledge as an end in itself toward an ever greater end—an end initiated in knowing itself:

I observe, then, and ask you, ... to bear in mind, that the philosophy of an imperial intellect, for such I am considering the University to be, is based, not so much on simplification as on discrimination. Its true representative ... aims at no complete catalogue, or interpretation of the subjects of knowledge, but a following out, as far as man can, what in its fullness is mysterious and unfathomable." (371-372)

For this following out "the humility of the Gospel" is necessary, a virtue very far from the pretended humility or condescension of the world, "the act of a superior, who protests to himself, while he [condescends], that he is

superior still, and that he is doing nothing else but an act of grace towards those on whose level, in theory, he is placing himself." The humility of the Gospel "is not only a voluntary relinquishment of the privileges of our own station, but an actual participation or assumption of the condition of those to whom we stoop. This is true humility, to feel and to behave as if we were low; not, to cherish a notion of our importance, while we affect a low position." (176) Against sacrificial humility even academic pride finds it difficult to contend.

## NOTES

I wish to thank Lyndon Reynolds and Stephen Glaze for their close reading of the final draft of this paper and for their many useful suggestions for improvement.

<sup>1</sup> To sketch the dimensions of the debate in this paper is impossible. In general, however, see Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987); Page Smith, *Killing the Spirit: Higher Education in America* (New York: Penguin, 1991); Dinesh D'Souza, *Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus* (New York: Free Press, 1991); Arthur Schlesinger Jr., *The Disuniting of America* (New York: Norton, 1992); Gertrude Himmelfarb, *On Looking into the Abyss: Untimely Thoughts on Culture and Society* (New York: Vintage, 1995); Todd Gitlin, *The Twilight of Common Dreams: Why America is Wracked by Culture Wars* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996); Richard F. Hamilton, *The Social Reconstruction of Reality: Validity and Verification in the Scholarly Community* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).

<sup>2</sup> A good example of the phenomenon occurred in 1996, when, to mention only one press, there appeared two studies critical of present university practice (Bill Readings, *The University in Ruins* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996] and David Damrosch, *We Scholars: Changing the Culture of the University* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996]) less than a year after the fourth edition of Clark Kerr's defense of the contemporary institution, *The Uses of the University* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995). The latter, interestingly enough, upholds the place of contemporary higher education against John Henry Newman's "academic cloister."

<sup>3</sup> For a review of modern Catholic education in America see Philip Gleason, *Conquering with Modernity: Catholic Higher Education in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). On Protestant approaches see George M. Marsden and Bradley J. Longfield, *The Secularization of the Academy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) and George M. Marsden, *The Soul of the American University: From Protestant Establishment to Established Unbelief* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). On the problematic transference of learning from the academy to the populace see Conrad Cherry, *Hurrying toward Zion: Universities, Divinity Schools, and American Protestantism* (Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 1996). For a discussion of the debate over teaching and research from a Christian perspective, a topic not taken up directly in this essay, but referred to by Newman in his preface, see Mark R. Schweln, *Exiles from Eden: Religion and the Academic Vocation in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). See as well, Glenn W. Olsen, "The university as community: Community of what?" *Communio* 21 (1994), 344-67.

<sup>4</sup> All references in this essay are to the critical edition: John Henry Newman, *The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated: I. In Nine Discourses Delivered to the Catholics of Dublin; II. In Occasional Lectures and Essays Addressed to Members of the Catholic University*, ed. Ian T. Ker (Oxford, 1976). When a quotation is followed immediately by one or more from the same page, the last quotation only is indicated with the page number in round brackets. The best study of Newman's educational ideal remains A. Dwight Culler, *The Imperial Intellect: A Study of Newman's Educational Ideal* (New Haven, 1955). Note as well Fergal McGrath's *Newman's University: Idea and Reality* (New York, 1951) and *The Consecration of Learning: Lectures on Newman's Idea of a University* (New York, 1962) and the relevant sections in

Wilfrid Ward. *The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman* (London, 1912). For more recent interpretations see Edward Jeremy Miller, "Newman's Idea of a University: Is it Viable Today?" in Gerard Magill (ed.), *Discourse and Context: An Interdisciplinary Study of John Henry Newman* (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993), 109-25. A useful reading of Newman's argument in a contemporary context is David H. Kelsey, *Between Athens and Jerusalem: The Theological Education Debate* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1993), albeit Kelsey underestimates the importance of Newman's emphasis on the role of community. See also John Coulson (ed.), *Theology and the University: An Ecclesiastical Investigation* (London, 1964).

<sup>51</sup>M. Cameron, *John Henry Newman* (London, 1956), 24-25.

<sup>52</sup>John Henry Newman, *The Idea of a University*, ed. by Frank M. Turner (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996). This edition includes interpretive essays by Martha McKackin Garland, Sara Castro-Klarén, George P. Landow, George M. Marsden, and Turner.

<sup>53</sup>On Newman's life and the background to his composition of *The Idea of a University* see Ian Ker, *John Henry Newman: A Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) and above all Sheridan Gilley, *Newman and His Age* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1990).

<sup>54</sup>Note the final form of the contents of the Idea, particularly Part Two:

*Part One: University Teaching*

1. Introductory
2. Theology a Branch of Knowledge
3. Bearing of Theology on other Branches of Knowledge
4. Bearing of other Branches of Knowledge on Theology
5. Knowledge its own End
6. Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Learning
7. Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Professional Skill
8. Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Religion
9. Duties of the Church towards Knowledge

*1857 Appendix\**

(\*Originally Lecture Five: Knowledge is the Direct End of University Education)

*Part Two: University Subjects*

1. Christianity and Letters (1854)
2. Literature (1854)
3. English Catholic Literature (1854-58)
  1. In its relation to Religious Literature
  2. In its relation to Science
  3. In its relation to Classical Literature
  4. In its relation to the Literature of the Day
4. Elementary Studies (1854-56)
  1. Grammar
  2. Composition
  3. Latin Writing
  4. General Religious Knowledge
5. A Form of Infidelity of the Day (1855)
  1. Its Sentiments
  2. Its Policy

6. University Preaching (1855)
7. Christianity and Physical Science. A Lecture in the School of Medicine (1855)
8. Christianity and Scientific Investigation (1855)
9. Discipline of Mind. An Address to the Evening Classes (1858)
10. Christianity and Medical Science (1858)

<sup>55</sup>Perhaps the most striking example of such an omission is Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Idea of a University: A Reexamination* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

<sup>102</sup>Structure is only one aspect of Newman's style to which a reader must attend in interpreting his work: Newman's delight in nuance, allusion, and, broadly speaking, irony is more problematic, and if not legitimating Kingsley's later claim that Newman held that "Truth, for its own sake, ... need not be [a virtue], and on the whole ought not to be, that cunning is the weapon which Heaven has given to the saints," at least gives us reason for understanding it: "What then does Dr. Newman Mean?" (For Charles Kingsley's article by this title, see John Henry Newman, *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, edited by David J. McLaura [New York, 1968], 310-40. For Kingsley's earlier quotation, see *ibid.*, 298.) The question is a serious one and readers of *The Idea* are immediately faced with it, as Newman himself recognized. After delineating in his preface the two principles on which his work was based, he devotes a full paragraph to pointing out that he is not "secured" from "incidental misconceptions of my meaning on the part of the reader," the very adjective "incidental" being his argument which continues with the denial that he has "seriously followed the English idea of a University," (italics mine) and a full-page treatment of "the reason contemplated by the Holy See in recommending just now to the Irish Hierarchy the establishment of a Catholic University." What frustrates the contemporary reader (and must have frustrated nineteenth-century readers as well) is not only Newman's practice of taking from his opposition while proposing to give, but his use of rhetorical questions all of which are turned against the argument of the most stalwart opponents while supposedly accepting their position.

<sup>11</sup>*Apologia*, 186.

<sup>12</sup>In 1854 Newman published a series of essays in which he outlined a history of the universities and the intellectual tradition ("The Rise and Progress of Universities," *Historical Sketches* [3 vols.: London, 1872], 1-251), although in these he tended to place emphasis primarily on the intellectual tradition in itself. Note, however, the ideals implied in his 1838 essay "Medieval Oxford" (*ibid.*, 313-35).

<sup>13</sup>For a good overview of this issue see Nicolaus Lobkowitz, *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx* (Notre Dame, 1967) and compare Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago, 1965).

<sup>14</sup>The etymology deriving *theoria* from *theos* was accepted by the early Peripatetics (see Gerhard Kittel, *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, trans. and ed. by Geoffrey W. Bromiley [10 vols.: Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1976-76], 5:318), and was common thereafter. See Pseudo-Plutarch, *On Music*, 27 and discussion in Lobkowitz, 7. Note also Joannes Balbus, *Catholicism* (Mamz, 1460), "theoria." On the link between *contemplatio* and *templum*, see Varro, *On the Latin Language*, 7:9.

<sup>15</sup>For a good modern review of the matter see Josef Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, trans. by Alexander Dru (London, 1952).

<sup>16</sup>Note the slight reformulation of this in the lecture not included in the final printed version of his book (423), and compare 57, 87, 96-97, 103-05, 116-17, 121, 125, 132, 156, 371-72.

<sup>17</sup>Walter Pater, *The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry* (Oxford, 1973; first published, 1873), Conclusion.

<sup>18</sup>Compare his application of the passage from Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, 1.5 quoted above.

<sup>19</sup>For a brief and clear discussion of this issue see John Finnis, *Fundamentals of Ethics* (Washington, 1983), "The Practicality of Ethics," 1-25.

<sup>20</sup>On all this see McGrath, *Consecration of Learning* and John Henry Newman, *My Campaign in Ireland* (Aberdeen: A. King, 1896).

<sup>21</sup>John Henry Newman, *Newman's University Sermons: Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford 1826-1843*, with introductory essays by D. M. MacKinnon and J. D. Holmes (London, 1970), 290-91).

<sup>22</sup>Note Nicolas Wiseman's argument regarding the Augustinian phrase "securus iudicat orbis terrarum" ("The Catholic and Anglican Churches, [Review of] Tracts for the Times London 1833-1838," in the *Dublin Review* [August, 1839] and reprinted in his *Essays on Various Subjects* [3 vols.: London, 1853], 2:203-62) and Newman's "The Catholicity of the Anglican Church [1840]," *Essays: Critical and Historical* (2 vols.: London, 1871), 2:1-

111. For an overview of the concept of catholicity in general see Avery Dulles, *The Catholicity of the Church* (Oxford, 1985).

<sup>23</sup>John Henry Newman, "The Tamworth Reading Room [February, 1841]," *Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects* (London, 1872), 268.

<sup>24</sup>John Paul II, "Apostolic Constitution *Ex corde ecclesiae* on Catholic Universities" (Boston, 1990), 9, 40, 41; of earlier writers only Augustine merits place.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>27</sup>Title page motto to John Henry Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*, ed. by Ian Ker (Oxford, 1985).

<sup>28</sup>On the application of the principle to secular knowledge see 157, 185, 198, 224.

<sup>29</sup>On the sovereignty of Truth, see 385 and note the discussion 372-75, and 382-85.

<sup>30</sup>For details see David Nicholls, *Church and State in England since 1820* (London, 1967).

<sup>31</sup>On this and similar issues see Ward, *Newman*, chapters 21 and 26.

<sup>32</sup>On this issue see particularly Karl Loewith, *Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History* (Chicago, 1949) and the relevant sections opposing his argument in Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, trans. by Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, Mass., 1983).

<sup>33</sup>This highly complex problem has been treated in the much discussed work of Alasdair C. MacIntyre, particularly his *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopedia, Genealogy, and Tradition: Being Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh in 1988* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1988), and *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (London, 1981). For other differing and important studies see John Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason* (London: Blackwell, 1990) and above all Kieran Flanagan, *The Enchantment of Sociology: A Study of Theology and Culture* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996). A full issue of *New Blackfriars* was devoted to each of the two latter works (Milbank in *ibid.* 73 [June, 1992] and Flanagan in *ibid.* [March, 1997]).

<sup>34</sup>For a valuable treatment of this issue see the comments of the Catholic "conservative" David Schindler on the "neoconservative" program of persons such as Michael Novak and Richard Neuhaus in *The Catholic World Report* (October, 1994), 42-49; see as well *ibid.*, (December, 1994), 58-61, and Schindler and Stratford Caldecott, "A civilization of love: The pope's call to the West," *Communio* 21 (1994), 497-503, which includes a joint statement by editors of both "left" and "right" Catholic reviews.

<sup>35</sup>A similar argument may lie at the base of his considerations on the inopportunism of a declaration regarding papal infallibility. For a review of his position in this regard see John R. Page, *What will Dr. Newman Say? John Henry Newman and Papal Infallibility 1865-1875* (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1994).

<sup>36</sup>See 110-11. Note, as well, his later comments: "Liberal Knowledge has a special tendency ... when cultivated by beings such as we, to impress us with a mere philosophical theory of life and conduct, in the place of Revelation" (155); and "Knowledge, viewed as Knowledge, exerts a subtle influence in throwing us back on ourselves, and in making us our own centre and our minds the measure of all things" (186).

Aquinas Center of Theology

(Center for Catholic Studies at Emory University)

1703 Clifton Road, Suite F-5

Atlanta

GA 30322-4037